initial commit

imported from https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux.git commit 9d5cc9d9d6501d7f1dd7e194d4b245bd0b6c6a22 version 6.11.4-1
2024-10-23 12:12:30 +03:00
commit c3d09a3e94
1108 changed files with 137488 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:23:55 +0000
+Subject: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20160111152355.GS28542@decadent.org.uk/
+
+When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
+access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
+makes this value the default.
+
+This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
+(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
+the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
+at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+ include/linux/perf_event.h | 5 +++++
+ kernel/events/core.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ security/Kconfig           | 9 +++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
+@@ -1589,6 +1589,11 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(co
+ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ 		void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ 
+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
+{
+	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
+}
+
+ /* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+ #define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
+ 
+--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
+@@ -419,8 +419,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cac
+  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
+  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
+  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
+ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
+  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
+#else
+ int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
+#endif
+ 
+ /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
+ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
+@@ -12506,6 +12511,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+ 
+	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+ 	/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
+ 	err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ 	if (err)
+--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -51,6 +51,15 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
+ 
+ endchoice
+ 
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+	depends on PERF_EVENTS
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+	  changed.
+
+ config SECURITY
+ 	bool "Enable different security models"
+ 	depends on SYSFS