1
0

release 6.14.4

This commit is contained in:
Konstantin Demin 2025-04-26 01:02:31 +03:00
parent f2e779751a
commit 23be27fbba
43 changed files with 497 additions and 637 deletions
debian
bin
changelog
config
patches
bugfix/all
debian
krd
mixed-arch
patchset-pf
patchset-xanmod
patchset-zen
series
rules.d/tools/bpf/resolve_btfids
rules.real
templates

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ w=$(git rev-parse --path-format=absolute --show-toplevel) ; : "${w:?}" ; cd "$w"
dst='debian/patches/pf-tmp'
src='../linux-extras'
branches='amd-pstate cpuidle crypto fixes fuse kbuild smb zstd'
branches='amd-pstate btrfs cpuidle crypto fixes kbuild zstd'
if [ -d "${dst}" ] ; then rm -rf "${dst}" ; fi
mkdir -p "${dst}"

7
debian/changelog vendored

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
linux (6.14.4-1) sid; urgency=medium
* New upstream stable update:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/ChangeLog-6.14.4
-- Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com> Fri, 25 Apr 2025 20:05:32 +0300
linux (6.14.3-1) sid; urgency=medium
* New upstream stable update:

@ -1898,11 +1898,6 @@ CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO=y
##
# CONFIG_BFS_FS is not set
##
## file: fs/btrfs/Kconfig
##
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS is not set
##
## file: fs/coda/Kconfig
##

@ -6982,17 +6982,6 @@ CONFIG_BEFS_FS=m
##
CONFIG_BFS_FS=m
##
## file: fs/btrfs/Kconfig
##
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS=m
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_REF_VERIFY is not set
##
## file: fs/coda/Kconfig
##
@ -8592,7 +8581,6 @@ CONFIG_BCMA_BLOCKIO=y
CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_PCI_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_BCM_NET_PHYLIB=m
CONFIG_BCM_NET_PHYPTP=m
CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_PUNT_BIO=y
CONFIG_BRCMFMAC_PROTO_BCDC=y
CONFIG_BRCMFMAC_PROTO_MSGBUF=y
CONFIG_BRCMSMAC_LEDS=y

@ -3346,17 +3346,6 @@ CONFIG_9P_FS_SECURITY=y
##
# CONFIG_BFS_FS is not set
##
## file: fs/btrfs/Kconfig
##
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS=m
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_REF_VERIFY is not set
##
## file: fs/coda/Kconfig
##
@ -4031,7 +4020,6 @@ CONFIG_842_DECOMPRESS=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_PQ=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_RAID6_RECOV=m
CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_PUNT_BIO=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RNBD=y
CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB=m

@ -1712,6 +1712,11 @@ CONFIG_AUTOFS_FS=m
##
# CONFIG_BCACHEFS_FS is not set
##
## file: fs/btrfs/Kconfig
##
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS is not set
##
## file: fs/cachefiles/Kconfig
##

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
--- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
@@ -2627,7 +2627,7 @@ module_exit(exit_btrfs_fs)
@@ -2626,7 +2626,7 @@ module_exit(exit_btrfs_fs)
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("B-Tree File System (BTRFS)");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2024 22:13:03 +0300
Subject: hfs/hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read_key
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/bb5e07cb927724e0b47be371fa081141cfb14414
Syzbot reported an issue in hfs subsystem:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy_from_page include/linux/highmem.h:423 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read fs/hfs/bnode.c:35 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read_key+0x314/0x450 fs/hfs/bnode.c:70
Write of size 94 at addr ffff8880123cd100 by task syz-executor237/5102
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
memcpy_from_page include/linux/highmem.h:423 [inline]
hfs_bnode_read fs/hfs/bnode.c:35 [inline]
hfs_bnode_read_key+0x314/0x450 fs/hfs/bnode.c:70
hfs_brec_insert+0x7f3/0xbd0 fs/hfs/brec.c:159
hfs_cat_create+0x41d/0xa50 fs/hfs/catalog.c:118
hfs_mkdir+0x6c/0xe0 fs/hfs/dir.c:232
vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4300 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4298 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdir+0x6c/0x80 fs/namei.c:4298
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fbdd6057a99
Add a check for key length in hfs_bnode_read_key to prevent
out-of-bounds memory access. If the key length is invalid, the
key buffer is cleared, improving stability and reliability.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+5f3a973ed3dfb85a6683@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5f3a973ed3dfb85a6683
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241019191303.24048-1-kovalev@altlinux.org
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/hfs/bnode.c | 6 ++++++
fs/hfsplus/bnode.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ void hfs_bnode_read_key(struct hfs_bnode
else
key_len = tree->max_key_len + 1;
+ if (key_len > sizeof(hfs_btree_key) || key_len < 1) {
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(hfs_btree_key));
+ pr_err("hfs: Invalid key length: %d\n", key_len);
+ return;
+ }
+
hfs_bnode_read(node, key, off, key_len);
}
--- a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c
@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ void hfs_bnode_read_key(struct hfs_bnode
else
key_len = tree->max_key_len + 2;
+ if (key_len > sizeof(hfsplus_btree_key) || key_len < 1) {
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(hfsplus_btree_key));
+ pr_err("hfsplus: Invalid key length: %d\n", key_len);
+ return;
+ }
+
hfs_bnode_read(node, key, off, key_len);
}

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From: Ben Hutchings <benh@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2025 18:50:44 +0200
Subject: libbpf: Use the standard fixdep build rule
libbpf's all target depends on the fixdep target defined in
tools/scripts/Makefile.include. However the $(BPF_IN_SHARED) and
$(BPF_IN_STATIC) targets don't use it, but instead rebuild fixdep in
the staticobjs or sharedobjs subdirectory using a different command.
Change the $(BPF_IN_SHARED) and $(BPF_IN_STATIC) targets to depend on
fixdep and to symlink the executable into the respective output
subdirectory.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <benh@debian.org>
---
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/Makefile
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ all_cmd: $(CMD_TARGETS) check
$(SHARED_OBJDIR) $(STATIC_OBJDIR):
$(Q)mkdir -p $@
-$(BPF_IN_SHARED): force $(BPF_GENERATED) | $(SHARED_OBJDIR)
+$(BPF_IN_SHARED): fixdep force $(BPF_GENERATED) | $(SHARED_OBJDIR)
@(test -f ../../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h -a -f ../../../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h && ( \
(diff -B ../../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h ../../../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h >/dev/null) || \
echo "Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/bpf.h'" >&2 )) || true
@@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ $(BPF_IN_SHARED): force $(BPF_GENERATED)
@(test -f ../../include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h -a -f ../../../include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h && ( \
(diff -B ../../include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h ../../../include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h >/dev/null) || \
echo "Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/if_xdp.h'" >&2 )) || true
- $(SILENT_MAKE) -C $(srctree)/tools/build CFLAGS= LDFLAGS= OUTPUT=$(SHARED_OBJDIR) $(SHARED_OBJDIR)fixdep
+ ln -sf ../fixdep $(SHARED_OBJDIR)/
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=libbpf OUTPUT=$(SHARED_OBJDIR) CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHLIB_FLAGS)"
-$(BPF_IN_STATIC): force $(BPF_GENERATED) | $(STATIC_OBJDIR)
- $(SILENT_MAKE) -C $(srctree)/tools/build CFLAGS= LDFLAGS= OUTPUT=$(STATIC_OBJDIR) $(STATIC_OBJDIR)fixdep
+$(BPF_IN_STATIC): fixdep force $(BPF_GENERATED) | $(STATIC_OBJDIR)
+ ln -sf ../fixdep $(STATIC_OBJDIR)/
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=libbpf OUTPUT=$(STATIC_OBJDIR)
$(BPF_HELPER_DEFS): $(srctree)/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ use of $(ARCH) needs to be moved after this.
KCONFIG_CONFIG ?= .config
export KCONFIG_CONFIG
@@ -555,6 +525,35 @@ RUSTFLAGS_KERNEL =
@@ -554,6 +524,35 @@ RUSTFLAGS_KERNEL =
AFLAGS_KERNEL =
LDFLAGS_vmlinux =

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ is non-empty.
---
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1876,7 +1876,7 @@ PHONY += prepare
@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ PHONY += prepare
# now expand this into a simple variable to reduce the cost of shell evaluations
prepare: CC_VERSION_TEXT := $(CC_VERSION_TEXT)
prepare:

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ this reverts following commit:
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -4750,10 +4750,14 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
@@ -4751,10 +4751,14 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file)
}
out:

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ dependency on CONFIG_ARC and adds RUSTFLAGS.
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -872,6 +872,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-delete-null-pointe
@@ -871,6 +871,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-delete-null-pointe
ifdef CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -O2
KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Copt-level=2

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Os
@@ -879,6 +879,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Os
KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Copt-level=s
endif

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexandre Frade <kernel@xanmod.org>
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -884,6 +884,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
@@ -883,6 +883,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fivopts)
endif

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From a1eb9a3160dc9e3cee6abdeab8e41c2265a2d7a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 4506de20739ac4726a258faa98609a552184d2d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Sergio=20Gonz=C3=A1lez=20Collado?=
<sergio.collado@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2025 23:15:18 +0100

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 1ff7499aaa4cec11be79e97c118978fd781073a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From b5a4b82efd19d0687a5582a58f6830bf714e34fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:32:30 -0700
Subject: x86/tools: Drop duplicate unlikely() definition in

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 72096487bfe8ebc52731c264536418c51854d999 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 17:33:49 -0400
Subject: drm/amdgpu/mes11: optimize MES pipe FW version fetching
Don't fetch it again if we already have it. It seems the
don't reliably have the proper value at resume in some
cases.
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4083
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cherry-picked-for: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/121
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v11_0.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v11_0.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v11_0.c
@@ -899,6 +899,10 @@ static void mes_v11_0_get_fw_version(str
{
int pipe;
+ /* return early if we have already fetched these */
+ if (adev->mes.sched_version && adev->mes.kiq_version)
+ return;
+
/* get MES scheduler/KIQ versions */
mutex_lock(&adev->srbm_mutex);

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From a1dfb99dca82ff97b00ce76f8f987ade471875d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 762de1df7e501e019c3ae273c7e5e2d4c04b303c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 15:28:05 +0300
Subject: tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth_session()

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 7b594a3c7b41db58884da466607417ca27c08a1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From e3d18eed972374cfbac1e58cf109209b07c1e27e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 12:02:36 +0200
Subject: ice: mark ice_write_prof_mask_reg() as noinline

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 42a4f494db975d62916c73f5d637aef9be343d70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 74c95e079dc8b3c53ade90b2070458c0c69f3fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 19:51:44 +0200
Subject: fixes-6.14: update tpm2_start_auth_session() fix

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From d3140c22ed2bc3c98dcf251659d78572e154a993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From e56acee381a8e07edf1920fb58f3166f911b6e5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lingbo Kong <quic_lingbok@quicinc.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 19:31:18 +0800
Subject: wifi: ath12k: Abort scan before removing link interface to prevent

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From fa165a32074fba27286cc9d2464a647642ad6bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 8d0e02f81d08c7b1e082028af0f55a22e7e1dfb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 10:22:04 +0200
Subject: Kconfig: switch CONFIG_SYSFS_SYCALL default to n

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From f1e8e30bef3757904d9e963f02ef297cd0c33240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:08:57 -0400
Subject: drm/amdgpu/mes12: optimize MES pipe FW version fetching
Don't fetch it again if we already have it. It seems the
registers don't reliably have the value at resume in some
cases.
Fixes: 785f0f9fe742 ("drm/amdgpu: Add mes v12_0 ip block support (v4)")
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v12_0.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v12_0.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mes_v12_0.c
@@ -1390,17 +1390,20 @@ static int mes_v12_0_queue_init(struct a
mes_v12_0_queue_init_register(ring);
}
- /* get MES scheduler/KIQ versions */
- mutex_lock(&adev->srbm_mutex);
- soc21_grbm_select(adev, 3, pipe, 0, 0);
+ if (((pipe == AMDGPU_MES_SCHED_PIPE) && !adev->mes.sched_version) ||
+ ((pipe == AMDGPU_MES_KIQ_PIPE) && !adev->mes.kiq_version)) {
+ /* get MES scheduler/KIQ versions */
+ mutex_lock(&adev->srbm_mutex);
+ soc21_grbm_select(adev, 3, pipe, 0, 0);
- if (pipe == AMDGPU_MES_SCHED_PIPE)
- adev->mes.sched_version = RREG32_SOC15(GC, 0, regCP_MES_GP3_LO);
- else if (pipe == AMDGPU_MES_KIQ_PIPE && adev->enable_mes_kiq)
- adev->mes.kiq_version = RREG32_SOC15(GC, 0, regCP_MES_GP3_LO);
+ if (pipe == AMDGPU_MES_SCHED_PIPE)
+ adev->mes.sched_version = RREG32_SOC15(GC, 0, regCP_MES_GP3_LO);
+ else if (pipe == AMDGPU_MES_KIQ_PIPE && adev->enable_mes_kiq)
+ adev->mes.kiq_version = RREG32_SOC15(GC, 0, regCP_MES_GP3_LO);
- soc21_grbm_select(adev, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- mutex_unlock(&adev->srbm_mutex);
+ soc21_grbm_select(adev, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ mutex_unlock(&adev->srbm_mutex);
+ }
return 0;
}

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From ea3ec10cacc746176a25dbd74c8d168e1c096a62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 01:51:24 -0700
Subject: sched/eevdf: Fix se->slice being set to U64_MAX and resulting crash
There is a code path in dequeue_entities() that can set the slice of a
sched_entity to U64_MAX, which sometimes results in a crash.
The offending case is when dequeue_entities() is called to dequeue a
delayed group entity, and then the entity's parent's dequeue is delayed.
In that case:
1. In the if (entity_is_task(se)) else block at the beginning of
dequeue_entities(), slice is set to
cfs_rq_min_slice(group_cfs_rq(se)). If the entity was delayed, then
it has no queued tasks, so cfs_rq_min_slice() returns U64_MAX.
2. The first for_each_sched_entity() loop dequeues the entity.
3. If the entity was its parent's only child, then the next iteration
tries to dequeue the parent.
4. If the parent's dequeue needs to be delayed, then it breaks from the
first for_each_sched_entity() loop _without updating slice_.
5. The second for_each_sched_entity() loop sets the parent's ->slice to
the saved slice, which is still U64_MAX.
This throws off subsequent calculations with potentially catastrophic
results. A manifestation we saw in production was:
6. In update_entity_lag(), se->slice is used to calculate limit, which
ends up as a huge negative number.
7. limit is used in se->vlag = clamp(vlag, -limit, limit). Because limit
is negative, vlag > limit, so se->vlag is set to the same huge
negative number.
8. In place_entity(), se->vlag is scaled, which overflows and results in
another huge (positive or negative) number.
9. The adjusted lag is subtracted from se->vruntime, which increases or
decreases se->vruntime by a huge number.
10. pick_eevdf() calls entity_eligible()/vruntime_eligible(), which
incorrectly returns false because the vruntime is so far from the
other vruntimes on the queue, causing the
(vruntime - cfs_rq->min_vruntime) * load calulation to overflow.
11. Nothing appears to be eligible, so pick_eevdf() returns NULL.
12. pick_next_entity() tries to dereference the return value of
pick_eevdf() and crashes.
Dumping the cfs_rq states from the core dumps with drgn showed tell-tale
huge vruntime ranges and bogus vlag values, and I also traced se->slice
being set to U64_MAX on live systems (which was usually "benign" since
the rest of the runqueue needed to be in a particular state to crash).
Fix it in dequeue_entities() by always setting slice from the first
non-empty cfs_rq.
Fixes: aef6987d8954 ("sched/eevdf: Propagate min_slice up the cgroup hierarchy")
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f0c2d1072be229e1bdddc73c0703919a8b00c652.1745570998.git.osandov@fb.com
---
kernel/sched/fair.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -7096,9 +7096,6 @@ static int dequeue_entities(struct rq *r
h_nr_idle = task_has_idle_policy(p);
if (task_sleep || task_delayed || !se->sched_delayed)
h_nr_runnable = 1;
- } else {
- cfs_rq = group_cfs_rq(se);
- slice = cfs_rq_min_slice(cfs_rq);
}
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
@@ -7108,6 +7105,7 @@ static int dequeue_entities(struct rq *r
if (p && &p->se == se)
return -1;
+ slice = cfs_rq_min_slice(cfs_rq);
break;
}

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
From 81c23adad48324b73fe0993f332407c5be050bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 11:04:37 +0000
Subject: wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: set state to no-FW before reset handshake
The reset handshake attempts to kill the firmware, and it'll go
into a pretty much dead state once we do that. However, if it
times out, then we'll attempt to dump the firmware to be able
to see why it didn't respond. During this dump, we cannot treat
it as if it was still running, since we just tried to kill it,
otherwise dumping will attempt to send a DBGC stop command. As
this command will time out, we'll go into a reset loop.
For now, fix this by setting the trans->state to say firmware
isn't running before doing the reset handshake. In the longer
term, we should clean up the way this state is handled.
It's not entirely clear but it seems likely that this issue was
introduced by my rework of the error handling, prior to that it
would've been synchronous at that point and (I think) not have
attempted to reset since it was already doing down.
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219967
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219968
Closes: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/128
Fixes: 7391b2a4f7db ("wifi: iwlwifi: rework firmware error handling")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
---
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans-gen2.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans-gen2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans-gen2.c
@@ -147,8 +147,14 @@ static void _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_de
return;
if (trans->state >= IWL_TRANS_FW_STARTED &&
- trans_pcie->fw_reset_handshake)
+ trans_pcie->fw_reset_handshake) {
+ /*
+ * Reset handshake can dump firmware on timeout, but that
+ * should assume that the firmware is already dead.
+ */
+ trans->state = IWL_TRANS_NO_FW;
iwl_trans_pcie_fw_reset_handshake(trans);
+ }
trans_pcie->is_down = true;

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
From bd6633c0e527dbcf6b52d3b34b49a980b125c866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xiangsheng Hou <xiangsheng.hou@mediatek.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 19:50:49 +0800
Subject: virtiofs: add filesystem context source name check
In certain scenarios, for example, during fuzz testing, the source
name may be NULL, which could lead to a kernel panic. Therefore, an
extra check for the source name should be added.
Fixes: a62a8ef9d97d ("virtio-fs: add virtiofs filesystem")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # all LTS kernels
Signed-off-by: Xiangsheng Hou <xiangsheng.hou@mediatek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250407115111.25535-1-xiangsheng.hou@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c
@@ -1670,6 +1670,9 @@ static int virtio_fs_get_tree(struct fs_
unsigned int virtqueue_size;
int err = -EIO;
+ if (!fsc->source)
+ return invalf(fsc, "No source specified");
+
/* This gets a reference on virtio_fs object. This ptr gets installed
* in fc->iq->priv. Once fuse_conn is going away, it calls ->put()
* to drop the reference to this object.

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From c3eedd3e0d50a748c6c520ba00377aba8150c713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 11:26:50 +0000
Subject: ksmbd: Fix dangling pointer in krb_authenticate
krb_authenticate frees sess->user and does not set the pointer
to NULL. It calls ksmbd_krb5_authenticate to reinitialise
sess->user but that function may return without doing so. If
that happens then smb2_sess_setup, which calls krb_authenticate,
will be accessing free'd memory when it later uses sess->user.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1602,8 +1602,10 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmb
if (prev_sess_id && prev_sess_id != sess->id)
destroy_previous_session(conn, sess->user, prev_sess_id);
- if (sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID)
+ if (sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID) {
ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
+ sess->user = NULL;
+ }
retval = ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(sess, in_blob, in_len,
out_blob, &out_len);

@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
From 1932e1bb8624ec520da5f61e3f5bbdd16b9f320d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:19:46 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __smb2_lease_break_noti()
Move tcp_transport free to ksmbd_conn_free. If ksmbd connection is
referenced when ksmbd server thread terminates, It will not be freed,
but conn->tcp_transport is freed. __smb2_lease_break_noti can be performed
asynchronously when the connection is disconnected. __smb2_lease_break_noti
calls ksmbd_conn_write, which can cause use-after-free
when conn->ksmbd_transport is already freed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/connection.c | 4 +++-
fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 14 +++++++++-----
fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/connection.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.c
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@ void ksmbd_conn_free(struct ksmbd_conn *
xa_destroy(&conn->sessions);
kvfree(conn->request_buf);
kfree(conn->preauth_info);
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt))
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) {
+ ksmbd_free_transport(conn->transport);
kfree(conn);
+ }
}
/**
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c
@@ -93,17 +93,21 @@ static struct tcp_transport *alloc_trans
return t;
}
-static void free_transport(struct tcp_transport *t)
+void ksmbd_free_transport(struct ksmbd_transport *kt)
{
- kernel_sock_shutdown(t->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
- sock_release(t->sock);
- t->sock = NULL;
+ struct tcp_transport *t = TCP_TRANS(kt);
- ksmbd_conn_free(KSMBD_TRANS(t)->conn);
+ sock_release(t->sock);
kfree(t->iov);
kfree(t);
}
+static void free_transport(struct tcp_transport *t)
+{
+ kernel_sock_shutdown(t->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ ksmbd_conn_free(KSMBD_TRANS(t)->conn);
+}
+
/**
* kvec_array_init() - initialize a IO vector segment
* @new: IO vector to be initialized
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
int ksmbd_tcp_set_interfaces(char *ifc_list, int ifc_list_sz);
struct interface *ksmbd_find_netdev_name_iface_list(char *netdev_name);
+void ksmbd_free_transport(struct ksmbd_transport *kt);
int ksmbd_tcp_init(void);
void ksmbd_tcp_destroy(void);

@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
From 67437a4c66847a82ab538705b932144d4af28f4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 09:30:21 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb_break_all_levII_oplock()
There is a room in smb_break_all_levII_oplock that can cause racy issues
when unlocking in the middle of the loop. This patch use read lock
to protect whole loop.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/oplock.c | 29 +++++++++--------------------
fs/smb/server/oplock.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
@@ -129,14 +129,6 @@ static void free_opinfo(struct oplock_in
kfree(opinfo);
}
-static inline void opinfo_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
-{
- struct oplock_info *opinfo;
-
- opinfo = container_of(rcu_head, struct oplock_info, rcu_head);
- free_opinfo(opinfo);
-}
-
struct oplock_info *opinfo_get(struct ksmbd_file *fp)
{
struct oplock_info *opinfo;
@@ -157,8 +149,8 @@ static struct oplock_info *opinfo_get_li
if (list_empty(&ci->m_op_list))
return NULL;
- rcu_read_lock();
- opinfo = list_first_or_null_rcu(&ci->m_op_list, struct oplock_info,
+ down_read(&ci->m_lock);
+ opinfo = list_first_entry(&ci->m_op_list, struct oplock_info,
op_entry);
if (opinfo) {
if (opinfo->conn == NULL ||
@@ -171,8 +163,7 @@ static struct oplock_info *opinfo_get_li
}
}
}
-
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ up_read(&ci->m_lock);
return opinfo;
}
@@ -185,7 +176,7 @@ void opinfo_put(struct oplock_info *opin
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&opinfo->refcount))
return;
- call_rcu(&opinfo->rcu_head, opinfo_free_rcu);
+ free_opinfo(opinfo);
}
static void opinfo_add(struct oplock_info *opinfo)
@@ -193,7 +184,7 @@ static void opinfo_add(struct oplock_inf
struct ksmbd_inode *ci = opinfo->o_fp->f_ci;
down_write(&ci->m_lock);
- list_add_rcu(&opinfo->op_entry, &ci->m_op_list);
+ list_add(&opinfo->op_entry, &ci->m_op_list);
up_write(&ci->m_lock);
}
@@ -207,7 +198,7 @@ static void opinfo_del(struct oplock_inf
write_unlock(&lease_list_lock);
}
down_write(&ci->m_lock);
- list_del_rcu(&opinfo->op_entry);
+ list_del(&opinfo->op_entry);
up_write(&ci->m_lock);
}
@@ -1347,8 +1338,8 @@ void smb_break_all_levII_oplock(struct k
ci = fp->f_ci;
op = opinfo_get(fp);
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(brk_op, &ci->m_op_list, op_entry) {
+ down_read(&ci->m_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(brk_op, &ci->m_op_list, op_entry) {
if (brk_op->conn == NULL)
continue;
@@ -1358,7 +1349,6 @@ void smb_break_all_levII_oplock(struct k
if (ksmbd_conn_releasing(brk_op->conn))
continue;
- rcu_read_unlock();
if (brk_op->is_lease && (brk_op->o_lease->state &
(~(SMB2_LEASE_READ_CACHING_LE |
SMB2_LEASE_HANDLE_CACHING_LE)))) {
@@ -1388,9 +1378,8 @@ void smb_break_all_levII_oplock(struct k
oplock_break(brk_op, SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_NONE, NULL);
next:
opinfo_put(brk_op);
- rcu_read_lock();
}
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ up_read(&ci->m_lock);
if (op)
opinfo_put(op);
--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.h
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ struct oplock_info {
struct list_head lease_entry;
wait_queue_head_t oplock_q; /* Other server threads */
wait_queue_head_t oplock_brk; /* oplock breaking wait */
- struct rcu_head rcu_head;
};
struct lease_break_info {

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From d9f3fc321672406f959334509a88296187994c5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 09:31:08 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix the warning from __kernel_write_iter
[ 2110.972290] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2110.972301] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 735 at fs/read_write.c:599 __kernel_write_iter+0x21b/0x280
This patch doesn't allow writing to directory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/vfs.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs.c
@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_write(struct ksmbd_work *w
int err = 0;
if (work->conn->connection_type) {
- if (!(fp->daccess & (FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE | FILE_APPEND_DATA_LE))) {
+ if (!(fp->daccess & (FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE | FILE_APPEND_DATA_LE)) ||
+ S_ISDIR(file_inode(fp->filp)->i_mode)) {
pr_err("no right to write(%pD)\n", fp->filp);
err = -EACCES;
goto out;

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From adbf65091f5ac103ae5339bd49549b147906a0c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 12:04:49 +0300
Subject: ksmbd: Prevent integer overflow in calculation of deadtime
The user can set any value for 'deadtime'. This affects the arithmetic
expression 'req->deadtime * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL', which is subject to
overflow. The added check makes the server behavior more predictable.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
@@ -310,7 +310,11 @@ static int ipc_server_config_on_startup(
server_conf.signing = req->signing;
server_conf.tcp_port = req->tcp_port;
server_conf.ipc_timeout = req->ipc_timeout * HZ;
- server_conf.deadtime = req->deadtime * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL;
+ if (check_mul_overflow(req->deadtime, SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL,
+ &server_conf.deadtime)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
server_conf.share_fake_fscaps = req->share_fake_fscaps;
ksmbd_init_domain(req->sub_auth);
@@ -337,6 +341,7 @@ static int ipc_server_config_on_startup(
server_conf.bind_interfaces_only = req->bind_interfaces_only;
ret |= ksmbd_tcp_set_interfaces(KSMBD_STARTUP_CONFIG_INTERFACES(req),
req->ifc_list_sz);
+out:
if (ret) {
pr_err("Server configuration error: %s %s %s\n",
req->netbios_name, req->server_string,

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexandre Frade <kernel@xanmod.org>
void (*iter)(struct nf_flowtable *flowtable,
struct flow_offload *flow, void *data),
void *data)
@@ -580,6 +578,7 @@ static void nf_flow_offload_gc_step(stru
@@ -582,6 +580,7 @@ static void nf_flow_offload_gc_step(stru
nf_flow_offload_stats(flow_table, flow);
}
}

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexandre Frade <kernel@xanmod.org>
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1056,15 +1056,8 @@ export CC_FLAGS_FPU
@@ -1055,15 +1055,8 @@ export CC_FLAGS_FPU
export CC_FLAGS_NO_FPU
ifneq ($(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT),0)

@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/old_microcode
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/old_microcode.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=============
+Old Microcode
+=============
+
+The kernel keeps a table of released microcode. Systems that had
+microcode older than this at boot will say "Vulnerable". This means
+that the system was vulnerable to some known CPU issue. It could be
+security or functional, the kernel does not know or care.
+
+You should update the CPU microcode to mitigate any exposure. This is
+usually accomplished by updating the files in
+/lib/firmware/intel-ucode/ via normal distribution updates. Intel also
+distributes these files in a github repo:
+
+ https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files.git
+
+Just like all the other hardware vulnerabilities, exposure is
+determined at boot. Runtime microcode updates do not change the status
+of this vulnerability.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -535,4 +535,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* "rfds" CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
#define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* "bhi" CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "spectre_v2_user" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack between user processes */
+#define X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "old_microcode" CPU has old microcode, it is surely vulnerable to something */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2806,6 +2806,14 @@ static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
}
+static ssize_t old_microcode_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: running under hypervisor");
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
@@ -2988,6 +2996,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_RFDS:
return rfds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE:
+ return old_microcode_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -3067,6 +3078,11 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_old_microcode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE);
+}
#endif
void __warn_thunk(void)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1317,10 +1317,52 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u6
return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
}
+static struct x86_cpu_id cpu_latest_microcode[] = {
+#include "microcode/intel-ucode-defs.h"
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_has_old_microcode(void)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_latest_microcode);
+
+ /* Give unknown CPUs a pass: */
+ if (!m) {
+ /* Intel CPUs should be in the list. Warn if not: */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ pr_info("x86/CPU: Model not found in latest microcode list\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Hosts usually lie to guests with a super high microcode
+ * version. Just ignore what hosts tell guests:
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Consider all debug microcode to be old: */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.microcode & BIT(31))
+ return true;
+
+ /* Give new microocode a pass: */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= m->driver_data)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Uh oh, too old: */
+ return true;
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if (cpu_has_old_microcode()) {
+ pr_warn("x86/CPU: Running old microcode\n");
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ }
+
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel-ucode-defs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x03, .steppings = 0x0004, .driver_data = 0x2 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x05, .steppings = 0x0001, .driver_data = 0x45 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x05, .steppings = 0x0002, .driver_data = 0x40 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x05, .steppings = 0x0004, .driver_data = 0x2c },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x05, .steppings = 0x0008, .driver_data = 0x10 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0001, .driver_data = 0xa },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0020, .driver_data = 0x3 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0400, .driver_data = 0xd },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x2000, .driver_data = 0x7 },
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+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x01, .steppings = 0x0004, .driver_data = 0x2e },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x02, .steppings = 0x0010, .driver_data = 0x21 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x02, .steppings = 0x0020, .driver_data = 0x2c },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x02, .steppings = 0x0040, .driver_data = 0x10 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x02, .steppings = 0x0080, .driver_data = 0x39 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x02, .steppings = 0x0200, .driver_data = 0x2f },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x03, .steppings = 0x0004, .driver_data = 0xa },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x03, .steppings = 0x0008, .driver_data = 0xc },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x03, .steppings = 0x0010, .driver_data = 0x17 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0002, .driver_data = 0x17 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0008, .driver_data = 0x5 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0010, .driver_data = 0x6 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0080, .driver_data = 0x3 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0100, .driver_data = 0xe },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0200, .driver_data = 0x3 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x04, .steppings = 0x0400, .driver_data = 0x4 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0004, .driver_data = 0xf },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0010, .driver_data = 0x4 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0020, .driver_data = 0x8 },
+{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0xf, .model = 0x06, .steppings = 0x0100, .driver_data = 0x9 },
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(spec_rstack_overf
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(gds);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(reg_file_data_sampling);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(ghostwrite);
+CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(old_microcode);
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow,
static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(ghostwrite, 0444, cpu_show_ghostwrite, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(old_microcode, 0444, cpu_show_old_microcode, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -633,6 +635,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_ghostwrite.attr,
+ &dev_attr_old_microcode.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct devic
extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_ghostwrite(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_old_microcode(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250226030129.530345-3-riel@surriel.com
static inline int rdmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long *p)
{
u32 gprs[8] = { 0 };
@@ -1140,6 +1142,10 @@ static void cpu_detect_tlb_amd(struct cp
@@ -1145,6 +1147,10 @@ static void cpu_detect_tlb_amd(struct cp
tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = eax & mask;
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] >> 1;

@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250226030129.530345-13-riel@surriel.com
/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -1076,6 +1076,10 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
@@ -1081,6 +1081,10 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
/* AMD CPUs don't need fencing after x2APIC/TSC_DEADLINE MSR writes. */
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE);

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1078,11 +1078,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-overflow
@@ -1077,11 +1077,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-overflow
# Make sure -fstack-check isn't enabled (like gentoo apparently did)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-check

25
debian/patches/series vendored

@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ features/x86/x86-make-x32-syscall-support-conditional.patch
bugfix/all/disable-some-marvell-phys.patch
bugfix/all/fs-add-module_softdep-declarations-for-hard-coded-cr.patch
bugfix/all/documentation-use-relative-source-paths-in-abi-documentation.patch
bugfix/all/hfs-hfsplus-fix-slab-out-of-bounds-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch
# Miscellaneous features
@ -102,6 +101,7 @@ bugfix/all/perf-tools-support-extra-cxxflags.patch
bugfix/all/perf-tools-pass-extra_cflags-through-to-libbpf-build-again.patch
bugfix/all/kbuild-bpf-fix-btf-reproducibility.patch
bugfix/all/perf-docs-Fix-perf-check-manual-page-built-with-asci.patch
bugfix/all/libbpf-use-the-standard-fixdep-build-rule.patch
# ABI maintenance
@ -156,14 +156,6 @@ patchset-pf/cpuidle/0001-cpuidle-Prefer-teo-over-menu-governor.patch
patchset-pf/crypto/0001-crypto-x86-aes-xts-make-the-fast-path-64-bit-specifi.patch
patchset-pf/crypto/0002-crypto-x86-aes-ctr-rewrite-AESNI-AVX-optimized-CTR-a.patch
patchset-pf/fuse/0001-virtiofs-add-filesystem-context-source-name-check.patch
patchset-pf/smb/0001-ksmbd-Fix-dangling-pointer-in-krb_authenticate.patch
patchset-pf/smb/0002-ksmbd-fix-use-after-free-in-__smb2_lease_break_noti.patch
patchset-pf/smb/0003-ksmbd-fix-use-after-free-in-smb_break_all_levII_oplo.patch
patchset-pf/smb/0004-ksmbd-fix-the-warning-from-__kernel_write_iter.patch
patchset-pf/smb/0005-ksmbd-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-calculation-of-dea.patch
patchset-pf/zstd/0001-zstd-import-upstream-v1.5.7.patch
patchset-pf/zstd/0002-lib-zstd-Refactor-intentional-wrap-around-test.patch
@ -268,14 +260,13 @@ patchset-zen/sauce/0023-ZEN-INTERACTIVE-Document-PDS-BMQ-configuration.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0001-Kunit-to-check-the-longest-symbol-length.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0002-x86-tools-Drop-duplicate-unlikely-definition-in-insn.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0003-drm-amdgpu-mes11-optimize-MES-pipe-FW-version-fetchi.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0004-tpm-Mask-TPM-RC-in-tpm2_start_auth_session.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0005-ice-mark-ice_write_prof_mask_reg-as-noinline.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0006-fixes-6.14-update-tpm2_start_auth_session-fix.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0007-drm-amdgpu-mes12-optimize-MES-pipe-FW-version-fetchi.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0008-wifi-iwlwifi-pcie-set-state-to-no-FW-before-reset-ha.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0009-wifi-ath12k-Abort-scan-before-removing-link-interfac.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0010-Kconfig-switch-CONFIG_SYSFS_SYCALL-default-to-n.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0003-tpm-Mask-TPM-RC-in-tpm2_start_auth_session.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0004-ice-mark-ice_write_prof_mask_reg-as-noinline.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0005-fixes-6.14-update-tpm2_start_auth_session-fix.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0006-wifi-ath12k-Abort-scan-before-removing-link-interfac.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0007-Kconfig-switch-CONFIG_SYSFS_SYCALL-default-to-n.patch
patchset-pf/fixes/0008-sched-eevdf-Fix-se-slice-being-set-to-U64_MAX-and-re.patch
patchset-zen/fixes/0001-arch-Kconfig-Default-to-maximum-amount-of-ASLR-bits.patch
patchset-zen/fixes/0002-drivers-firmware-skip-simpledrm-if-nvidia-drm.modese.patch
patchset-zen/fixes/0003-x86-cpu-Help-users-notice-when-running-old-Intel-microcode.patch

@ -3,8 +3,14 @@ PROGS = resolve_btfids
include $(top_rulesdir)/Makefile.inc
resolve_btfids:
# resolve_btfids always uses HOSTCC, HOSTLD, and HOSTAR; we need to
# override these on the command line to make cross-builds work. But
# it also builds fixdep which still needs to be native in a
# cross-build. Set REALHOSTCC and REALHOSTLD variables which will be
# used for fixdep.
$(MAKE) -C $(top_srcdir)/tools/bpf/resolve_btfids O=$(CURDIR) \
HOSTCC=$(CC) HOSTCFLAGS='$(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS)' \
HOSTLD=$(CROSS_COMPILE)ld KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS='$(LDFLAGS)' \
HOSTAR=$(CROSS_COMPILE)ar \
REALHOSTCC=gcc REALHOSTLD=ld \
V=1

13
debian/rules.real vendored

@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ endif
ifdef COMPAT_GNU_TYPE
echo 'override CROSS_COMPILE_COMPAT = $(COMPAT_GNU_TYPE)-' >> '$(DIR)/.kernelvariables'
echo 'override CROSS32_COMPILE = $(COMPAT_GNU_TYPE)-' >> '$(DIR)/.kernelvariables'
# These are not exported by default, and kconfig may need to see them
echo 'export CROSS_COMPILE_COMPAT CROSS32_COMPILE' >> '$(DIR)/.kernelvariables'
endif
echo 'DEBIAN_KERNEL_NO_CC_VERSION_CHECK = y' >> '$(DIR)/.kernelvariables'
+$(MAKE_CLEAN) -C '$(SOURCE_DIR)' O='$(CURDIR)/$(DIR)' listnewconfig
@ -358,17 +360,6 @@ binary_bpf-dev: build_bpf-dev
$(dh_binary_pre)
$(dh_binary_post)
build_support:
binary_support: PACKAGE_ROOT = /usr/share/$(PACKAGE_NAME)
binary_support:
$(dh_binary_pre)
dh_installdirs $(PACKAGE_ROOT)/lib/python/debian_linux $(PACKAGE_ROOT)/modules
cp debian/lib/python/debian_linux/*.py $(DESTDIR)$(PACKAGE_ROOT)/lib/python/debian_linux/
dh_python3
dh_link $(PACKAGE_ROOT) /usr/src/$(PACKAGE_NAME)
$(dh_binary_post)
setup_image: $(STAMPS_DIR)/setup_$(ARCH)_$(FEATURESET)_$(FLAVOUR)
build_image: $(STAMPS_DIR)/build_$(ARCH)_$(FEATURESET)_$(FLAVOUR)

@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
Package: krd-linux-support-@abiname@
Meta-Rules-Target: support
Build-Profiles: <!pkg.linux.notools>
Architecture: all
Section: devel
Depends: ${python3:Depends}, python3-dacite, python3-jinja2, ${misc:Depends}
Multi-Arch: foreign
Description: Support files for KrD's Linux kernel @upstreamversion@
This package provides support files for the Linux kernel build,
e.g. scripts to handle ABI information and for generation of
build system meta data.

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Build-Depends:
python3-jinja2:native,
# used by debian/rules.real to prepare the source
quilt,
# used by debian/rules.real to build linux-perf and linux-support
# used by debian/rules.real to build linux-perf
dh-python <!pkg.linux.notools>,
Build-Depends-Arch:
# used by upstream to build include/generated/timeconst.h