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release 6.14.2

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This commit is contained in:
Konstantin Demin
2025-04-11 00:38:04 +03:00
parent 12ad6316be
commit 0a221c5ce2
99 changed files with 634 additions and 2270 deletions
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2
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0001-cifs-avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-dbg-call.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From c1a019d5fef8266e444159bc2bdaf9a5c9c7ef76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c78ab32399be35eed11e986293804eab75bfbe21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexandra Diupina <adiupina@astralinux.ru>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:28:58 +0300
Subject: cifs: avoid NULL pointer dereference in dbg call

4
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0003-CIFS-Propagate-min-offload-along-with-other-paramete.patch → debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0002-CIFS-Propagate-min-offload-along-with-other-paramete.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 419b06f0ca7662c17a026ab0117ba9887dbd0477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 53f2beb3fafc1395f502390f04ad876a0dd2102d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aman <aman1@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 17:46:43 +0000
Subject: CIFS: Propagate min offload along with other parameters from primary
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
--- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c
@@ -1676,6 +1676,7 @@ cifs_get_tcp_session(struct smb3_fs_cont
@@ -1677,6 +1677,7 @@ cifs_get_tcp_session(struct smb3_fs_cont
/* Grab netns reference for this server. */
cifs_set_net_ns(tcp_ses, get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns));

60
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0002-ksmbd-add-bounds-check-for-durable-handle-context.patch vendored
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@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
From 750b72183e7f3d9dc775540cee41c0c06d2c1da4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 18:21:47 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: add bounds check for durable handle context
Add missing bounds check for durable handle context.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2708,6 +2708,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
goto out;
}
+ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
+ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
+ sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
recon_v2 = (struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req *)context;
persistent_id = recon_v2->Fid.PersistentFileId;
dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id);
@@ -2741,6 +2748,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
goto out;
}
+ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
+ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
+ sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_req)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
recon = (struct create_durable_reconn_req *)context;
persistent_id = recon->Data.Fid.PersistentFileId;
dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id);
@@ -2765,6 +2779,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+
+ if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) +
+ le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) <
+ sizeof(struct create_durable_req_v2)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
durable_v2_blob =
(struct create_durable_req_v2 *)context;

2
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0006-cifs-fix-integer-overflow-in-match_server.patch → debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0003-cifs-fix-integer-overflow-in-match_server.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 87a17042db9d288d1c5bf3eac2a31bd3315a8cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 6b8b436fbb92dff7d6bc8d6c977b01814a541ec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 11:22:49 +0300
Subject: cifs: fix integer overflow in match_server()

41
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0004-ksmbd-add-bounds-check-for-create-lease-context.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From df179d4868b57eb8bcd7587559164178f17f0747 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2025 12:19:28 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: add bounds check for create lease context
Add missing bounds check for create lease context.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/oplock.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
@@ -1505,6 +1505,10 @@ struct lease_ctx_info *parse_lease_state
if (sizeof(struct lease_context_v2) == le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength)) {
struct create_lease_v2 *lc = (struct create_lease_v2 *)cc;
+ if (le16_to_cpu(cc->DataOffset) + le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength) <
+ sizeof(struct create_lease_v2) - 4)
+ return NULL;
+
memcpy(lreq->lease_key, lc->lcontext.LeaseKey, SMB2_LEASE_KEY_SIZE);
lreq->req_state = lc->lcontext.LeaseState;
lreq->flags = lc->lcontext.LeaseFlags;
@@ -1517,6 +1521,10 @@ struct lease_ctx_info *parse_lease_state
} else {
struct create_lease *lc = (struct create_lease *)cc;
+ if (le16_to_cpu(cc->DataOffset) + le32_to_cpu(cc->DataLength) <
+ sizeof(struct create_lease))
+ return NULL;
+
memcpy(lreq->lease_key, lc->lcontext.LeaseKey, SMB2_LEASE_KEY_SIZE);
lreq->req_state = lc->lcontext.LeaseState;
lreq->flags = lc->lcontext.LeaseFlags;

31
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0005-ksmbd-fix-use-after-free-in-ksmbd_sessions_deregiste.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From d72853120541d47779616db780a15a42afe4ad9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 09:20:19 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_sessions_deregister()
In multichannel mode, UAF issue can occur in session_deregister
when the second channel sets up a session through the connection of
the first channel. session that is freed through the global session
table can be accessed again through ->sessions of connection.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
if (!ksmbd_chann_del(conn, sess) &&
xa_empty(&sess->ksmbd_chann_list)) {
hash_del(&sess->hlist);
+ down_write(&conn->session_lock);
+ xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
+ up_write(&conn->session_lock);
ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
}
}

105
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0007-ksmbd-fix-session-use-after-free-in-multichannel-con.patch vendored
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@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
From 13cf611fba8e4bcb60b66abb0c2a2456d7863c18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 21:22:51 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix session use-after-free in multichannel connection
There is a race condition between session setup and
ksmbd_sessions_deregister. The session can be freed before the connection
is added to channel list of session.
This patch check reference count of session before freeing it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sean Heelan <seanheelan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/auth.c | 4 ++--
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 14 ++++++++------
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 7 ++++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/auth.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/auth.c
@@ -1016,9 +1016,9 @@ static int ksmbd_get_encryption_key(stru
ses_enc_key = enc ? sess->smb3encryptionkey :
sess->smb3decryptionkey;
- if (enc)
- ksmbd_user_session_get(sess);
memcpy(key, ses_enc_key, SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (!enc)
+ ksmbd_user_session_put(sess);
return 0;
}
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static void ksmbd_expire_session(struct
down_write(&sessions_table_lock);
down_write(&conn->session_lock);
xa_for_each(&conn->sessions, id, sess) {
- if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) == 0 &&
+ if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) <= 1 &&
(sess->state != SMB2_SESSION_VALID ||
time_after(jiffies,
sess->last_active + SMB2_SESSION_TIMEOUT))) {
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
down_write(&conn->session_lock);
xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
up_write(&conn->session_lock);
- ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
+ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
}
}
}
@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ void ksmbd_sessions_deregister(struct ks
if (xa_empty(&sess->ksmbd_chann_list)) {
xa_erase(&conn->sessions, sess->id);
hash_del(&sess->hlist);
- ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
+ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
}
}
up_write(&conn->session_lock);
@@ -312,8 +314,8 @@ void ksmbd_user_session_put(struct ksmbd
if (atomic_read(&sess->refcnt) <= 0)
WARN_ON(1);
- else
- atomic_dec(&sess->refcnt);
+ else if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sess->refcnt))
+ ksmbd_session_destroy(sess);
}
struct preauth_session *ksmbd_preauth_session_alloc(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
@@ -420,7 +422,7 @@ static struct ksmbd_session *__session_c
xa_init(&sess->rpc_handle_list);
sess->sequence_number = 1;
rwlock_init(&sess->tree_conns_lock);
- atomic_set(&sess->refcnt, 1);
+ atomic_set(&sess->refcnt, 2);
ret = __init_smb2_session(sess);
if (ret)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2239,13 +2239,14 @@ int smb2_session_logoff(struct ksmbd_wor
return -ENOENT;
}
- ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&sess->file_table);
down_write(&conn->session_lock);
sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED;
up_write(&conn->session_lock);
- ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
- sess->user = NULL;
+ if (sess->user) {
+ ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
+ sess->user = NULL;
+ }
ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(4);

70
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0008-ksmbd-fix-overflow-in-dacloffset-bounds-check.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
From 3fe0cc7e4d24b0a152798ec17ceed4156fe96033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 06:58:15 +0000
Subject: ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check
The dacloffset field was originally typed as int and used in an
unchecked addition, which could overflow and bypass the existing
bounds check in both smb_check_perm_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl().
This could result in out-of-bounds memory access and a kernel crash
when dereferencing the DACL pointer.
This patch converts dacloffset to unsigned int and uses
check_add_overflow() to validate access to the DACL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -1026,7 +1026,9 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
struct dentry *parent = path->dentry->d_parent;
struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
int inherited_flags = 0, flags = 0, i, nt_size = 0, pdacl_size;
- int rc = 0, dacloffset, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size;
+ int rc = 0, pntsd_type, pntsd_size, acl_len, aces_size;
+ unsigned int dacloffset;
+ size_t dacl_struct_end;
u16 num_aces, ace_cnt = 0;
char *aces_base;
bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(d_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode);
@@ -1035,8 +1037,11 @@ int smb_inherit_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *
parent, &parent_pntsd);
if (pntsd_size <= 0)
return -ENOENT;
+
dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(parent_pntsd->dacloffset);
- if (!dacloffset || (dacloffset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size)) {
+ if (!dacloffset ||
+ check_add_overflow(dacloffset, sizeof(struct smb_acl), &dacl_struct_end) ||
+ dacl_struct_end > (size_t)pntsd_size) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_parent_pntsd;
}
@@ -1240,7 +1245,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
struct smb_ntsd *pntsd = NULL;
struct smb_acl *pdacl;
struct posix_acl *posix_acls;
- int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size, dacl_offset;
+ int rc = 0, pntsd_size, acl_size, aces_size, pdacl_size;
+ unsigned int dacl_offset;
+ size_t dacl_struct_end;
struct smb_sid sid;
int granted = le32_to_cpu(*pdaccess & ~FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE);
struct smb_ace *ace;
@@ -1259,7 +1266,8 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
if (!dacl_offset ||
- (dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > pntsd_size))
+ check_add_overflow(dacl_offset, sizeof(struct smb_acl), &dacl_struct_end) ||
+ dacl_struct_end > (size_t)pntsd_size)
goto err_out;
pdacl = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset));

32
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0009-ksmbd-validate-zero-num_subauth-before-sub_auth-is-a.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From 0cf6aa54e0b5dbd9b1835a3b9f13a154216a7422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 16:06:01 +0000
Subject: ksmbd: validate zero num_subauth before sub_auth is accessed
Access psid->sub_auth[psid->num_subauth - 1] without checking
if num_subauth is non-zero leads to an out-of-bounds read.
This patch adds a validation step to ensure num_subauth != 0
before sub_auth is accessed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -270,6 +270,11 @@ static int sid_to_id(struct mnt_idmap *i
return -EIO;
}
+ if (psid->num_subauth == 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: zero subauthorities!\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
if (sidtype == SIDOWNER) {
kuid_t uid;
uid_t id;

125
debian/patches/patchset-pf/smb/0010-ksmbd-fix-null-pointer-dereference-in-alloc_preauth_.patch vendored
View File

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
From 21715f2a6462476a4196725e436c4b0d968390ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2025 09:11:23 +0900
Subject: ksmbd: fix null pointer dereference in alloc_preauth_hash()
The Client send malformed smb2 negotiate request. ksmbd return error
response. Subsequently, the client can send smb2 session setup even
thought conn->preauth_info is not allocated.
This patch add KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP status of connection to ignore
session setup request if smb2 negotiate phase is not complete.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-26505
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
---
fs/smb/server/connection.h | 11 +++++++++++
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 4 ++--
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 14 +++++++++++---
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/smb/server/connection.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum {
KSMBD_SESS_EXITING,
KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT,
KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE,
+ KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP,
KSMBD_SESS_RELEASING
};
@@ -187,6 +188,11 @@ static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_negot
return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE;
}
+static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_setup(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP;
+}
+
static inline bool ksmbd_conn_need_reconnect(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
{
return READ_ONCE(conn->status) == KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT;
@@ -217,6 +223,11 @@ static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_n
WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
}
+static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
+{
+ WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
+}
+
static inline void ksmbd_conn_set_need_reconnect(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
{
WRITE_ONCE(conn->status, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT);
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
@@ -358,13 +358,13 @@ void destroy_previous_session(struct ksm
ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT);
err = ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(conn, id);
if (err) {
- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
+ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
goto out;
}
ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&prev_sess->file_table);
prev_sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED;
- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
+ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
ksmbd_launch_ksmbd_durable_scavenger();
out:
up_write(&conn->session_lock);
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ int smb2_handle_negotiate(struct ksmbd_w
}
conn->srv_sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
- ksmbd_conn_set_need_negotiate(conn);
+ ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(conn);
err_out:
ksmbd_conn_unlock(conn);
@@ -1271,6 +1271,9 @@ static int alloc_preauth_hash(struct ksm
if (sess->Preauth_HashValue)
return 0;
+ if (!conn->preauth_info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
sess->Preauth_HashValue = kmemdup(conn->preauth_info->Preauth_HashValue,
PREAUTH_HASHVALUE_SIZE, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (!sess->Preauth_HashValue)
@@ -1674,6 +1677,11 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *w
ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Received smb2 session setup request\n");
+ if (!ksmbd_conn_need_setup(conn) && !ksmbd_conn_good(conn)) {
+ work->send_no_response = 1;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
WORK_BUFFERS(work, req, rsp);
rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(9);
@@ -1913,7 +1921,7 @@ out_err:
if (try_delay) {
ksmbd_conn_set_need_reconnect(conn);
ssleep(5);
- ksmbd_conn_set_need_negotiate(conn);
+ ksmbd_conn_set_need_setup(conn);
}
}
smb2_set_err_rsp(work);
@@ -2247,7 +2255,7 @@ int smb2_session_logoff(struct ksmbd_wor
ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
sess->user = NULL;
}
- ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE);
+ ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(sess_id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(4);
err = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, rsp, sizeof(struct smb2_logoff_rsp));